معاهدات‌ اقتصادی‌ مالی ؛ راهبردی در جذب ارزش‌های اقتصادی خارجی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

دانشیار گروه اقتصاد ، واحد نراق، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، نراق، ایران

چکیده

این پژوهش با هدف بررسی تعاملات استحکام معاهدات‌ اقتصادی‌ مالی، عدم ثبات نظام سیاسی و ساختار مالکیت در نظر گرفته شد. داده‌های مربوط به فعالیت‌های اقتصادی در سال 1401 برای دوره 1398 تا 1401 بنگاه‌های چند‌ملیتی‌ دارای متوسط 4 سرمایه‌گذاری خارجی جدید در سال به تعداد 116 انتخاب و جمع‌آوری گردید و با استفاده از رگرسیون لجستیک زوجی مورد تحلیل قرار گرفت. عدم ثبات نظام سیاسی و استحکام ‌‌معاهدات‌ اقتصادی‌ مالی به صورت غیرتعاملی تاثیر معنی‌داری بر ساختار مالکیت نداشته اما درحالت تعاملی باافزایش عدم ثبات نظام سیاسی، معاهدات‌ اقتصادی‌ مالی اقدام به معکوس کردن اولویت‌های بنگاه‌های چند‌ملیتی جهت انتخاب مالکیت اکثریت به جای مالکیت اقلیت می‌نماید. در سطوح بالاتر عدم ثبات نظام سیاسی، استحکام قاطع‌تر معاهدات‌ اقتصادی‌ مالی، احتمال افزایش انتخاب بنگاه‌های چند‌ملیتی از سهام را افزایش می‌دهد. استحکام ‌‌معاهدات‌ اقتصادی‌ مالی، رابطه بین عدم ثبات نظام سیاسی وساختار مالکیت راتعدیل می‌کند و بنگاه‌های چند‌ملیتی راترغیب می‌کند تامالکیت اکثریت را به جای اقلیت انتخاب کنند. در نهایت ماهیت چندسطحی از محیط فعالیت‌های اقتصادی تجاری نشان می‌دهد که بنگاه‌های چند‌ملیتی‌ بین‌المللی، باید ضمن موزون کردن خطرات/ریسک‌ها و مزایای احتمالی، تمهیدات مختلف مالکیت تحت شرایط مختلف عدم ثبات نظام سیاسی را در نظر بگیرند. معاهدات‌ اقتصادی‌ مالی سخت‌گیرانه در ارائه تعهد معتبر دربرابر سلب مالکیت و تأمین قدرت اطمینان بخشی که امکان مالکیت اکثریت توسط بنگاه‌های چند‌ملیتی‌ در کشورهای میزبان درسطوح بالاتر عدم ثبات نظام سیاسی رادارد، مؤثر است. بنابراین طراحی یک ساختار کاهش ریسک در سطح بین‌المللی بر چگونگی مشاهده بنگاه‌ها در یک محیط ناپایدار احتمالی درسطح ملی تأثیر می‌گذارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Economic and Financial Treaties; A Strategy in attracting Foreign Economic Values

نویسنده [English]

  • Mostafa Heidari Haratemeh
Associate Professor of the Department of Economics, Naragh Branch, Islamic Azad University, Naragh, Iran
چکیده [English]

The present research was considered with the aim of investigating the interactions between the rigidity and Rigidity of Financial economic agreements, the instability of the political system, and the Ownership structure. Data related to economic activities in the year 2022 for the period 2019 to 2022 multinational companies with an average of 4 new foreign investments per year were selected and collected with a number of 116 and analyzed using paired logistic regression. The instability of the political system and the rigidity/strigency of Financial economic agreements in a non-interactive way did not have a significant effect on the choice of affiliated ownership, but in an interactive mode, with the increase in the instability of the political system, the economic and Financial /commercial agreements reversed the priorities of multinational companies in order to choose Majority ownership replaces minority ownership. At higher levels of instability of the political system, the more decisive rigidity of Financial economic agreements increases the possibility of increasing the choice of multinational companies from stocks. The rigidity of Financial economic agreements moderates the relationship between political system instability and the choice of affiliate ownership and encourages MNEs to choose majority rather than minority ownership. Finally, The multi-level nature of the environment of business economic activities shows that international multinational companies should consider different ownership arrangements under different conditions of instability of the political system, while balancing risks/risks and possible benefits. Strict economic and financial agreements are effective in providing a credible commitment against expropriation and providing a reassuring power that allows majority ownership by multinational corporations in host countries at higher levels of political system instability. Therefore, the design of a risk mitigation structure at the international level affects how firms view a potentially unstable environment at the national level.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Financial Economic Agreements
  • Foreign Economic Values
  • Instability of the Political System
  • Multinational Enterprises

مراجع

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مدیریت زنجیره ارزش راهبردی
دوره 1، شماره 3 - شماره پیاپی 3
مقالات پژوهشی
دی 1403
صفحه 97-117

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سابقه مقاله

  • تاریخ دریافت: 04 شهریور 1403
  • تاریخ بازنگری: 01 آبان 1403
  • تاریخ پذیرش: 29 آبان 1403
  • تاریخ انتشار: 01 اسفند 1403

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